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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
TORTS--RIGHT OF PRIVACY-VIOLATION BY TAPPING TELEPHONE WIRES.-
Petition alleged that defendants illegally tapped telephone wires leading to
plaintiff's house, listened in on plaintiff's private conversations, and em-
ployed a stenographer to take shorthand notes of such conversations. Held,
such action constitutes a legal injury as an unwarranted invasion of the
right of privacy for which redress will be granted. Rhodes v. Graham et al.
(1931) 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. E. (2d) 46.
It is interesting to note that this is a further extension to a novel set-up
of a comparatively recent branch of the law, and that Kentucky was the
second state in this country to recognize this doctrine. Foster Milburn Co.
v. Chinn (1909) 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364. Georgia had previously done
so in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. (1905) 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E.
68. It is also in this jurisdiction that the most recent development of such
law has taken place. See note (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. REV. 306; Ragland,
The Right of Privacy (1929) 17 KY. L. J. 85.
In Brents v. Morgan (1927) 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967, the appellant
was held liable in tort for an unwarranted invasion of the plaintiff's right
of privacy by having placed upon his show window a conspicuous notice to
the effect that plaintiff owed him an account which he had made frequent
promises to pay but which the plaintiff had failed to do. The court recog-
nized the right of privacy as defined in Brandeis and Warren, The Right
to Privacy (1890) 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, and further stated that certain
limitations which the authors proposed were sound. Among those which
the court recognized was the principle that there could not be a grant of
redress for the invasion of privacy by oral publication.
The exception that the right to privacy does not prohibit any publication
of matter which is of public or general interest has led to controversy as
to what constitutes such matter, but the privilege in regard to such mat-
ters has been recognized. See Ragland, The Right of Privacy, above.
In Smith v. Suratt (1926) 7 Alaska 416, it was held that a North Pole
expedition and its equipment, the movements of its machinery and air-
planes, were of a public nature so that defendant had a right to photograph
anything connected with the enterprise, provided he did so lawfully, without
violating any confidence of the expedition or interfering with its members.
In Jones v. Herald-Post Co. (1929) 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972, publica-
tion of a woman's photograph with language attributed to her that she
fought with men who killed her husband was held not to be a violation of
the right of privacy since plaintiff had inndcently become an actor in an
occurrence of general public interest. In Melvin v. Reid (Cal. App. 1931)
297 Pac. 91, the defendants, without permission, released a motion picture
based on the true story of the plaintiff's life as found in the court records
seven years after plaintiff's acquittal on a murder charge, using plaintiff's
maiden name as a means of advertisement. Here it was held that the re-
lease of the biographical picture, advertised as such, was a violation of the
plaintiff's right of privacy, the court relying on the fact that the California
Constitution guarantees the right to pursue and obtain happiness.
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The recognition of the right of privacy as a right distinct from that pro-
tected by the rules of slander and libel has been extended in a growing
number of cases. In Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co: (1926) 162 La. 671, 111
So. 55, a petition alleging malicious injury to plaintiff's social standing by
forbidding defendant's employees and their families from visiting and
associating with plaintiff and his family, was held to state a cause of
action. A petition by the plaintiffs alleging an invasion of their right of
privacy by an unauthorized publication of a picture of their malformed
child, taken without their consent, after its death, was held, on demurrer,
to state a cause of action. Bozemore v. Savannah Hospital et at. (1930)
155 S. E. 194, 171 Ga. 257.
In the cases above cited, it will be noted that the element of publication
has been present. The right of privacy, however, is not dependent upon
the fact that parties other than the defendant are involved; the basis of
the action is the plaintiff's right to be let alone-to move about unham-
pered. In Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Insurance
Co. (1913) 151 Wis. 537, 139 N. W. 386, shadowing of the plaintiff by
private detectives was held actionable on the grounds that it publicly pro-
claimed him as suspect. The principal case is significant in that there
seems to be no publication involved, and the nature of the right is clearly
recognized as involving the feelings and sensibilities of the plaintiff with-
out regard to the public at large. An interesting question would arise as
to the liability of a party for listening in on telephone conversations with-
out the element of wire tapping being present.
It would seem that the right of privacy, while still in a state of evolu-
tion, is an established right and in those jurisdictions in which it has been
recognized, has developed mainly in accordance with the limitations sug-
gested by Brandeis and Warren, above. The principal case seems to be an
extension beyond the original claim of right, but it is a development which
has been made necessary by the invention and ever increasing use of the
telephone and radio, devices not in common use when the principles govern-
ing the right were crystallized. That further extension of the doctrine
along other lines will be made necessary by modern scientific advances
seems probable. H. H. G., '33.
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